SOCIAL COHESION AND TOLERANCE

Areas of Social Research

I. conceiving ‘social cohesion’

More and more these days in popular discourse and political rhetoric, social cohesion is only invoked by its absence: that is, while we are rarely presented with views of what a high degree of social cohesion might look like, we are bombarded with descriptions of the lack of social cohesion in contemporary society. Moreover, it is indications of social in-cohesion to which policy makers often refer and about which researchers mostly collect data. Conversely, if we wish to develop research and policy aimed at fostering or promoting social cohesion, we should develop clearer notions as to what it might look like and entail.

It is often presumed that social cohesion refers to some kind of identifiable condition of system stasis (or state of grace?) which societies fall from and aspire to. Supposedly characteristic of such a condition in any body of political and sociological theory -- and regarding practically any scale of inquiry, from neighbourhoods to nations -- social cohesion implies the presence of basic patterns of cooperative social interaction and core sets of collective values. The variegation of views on the nature of social cohesion arises when considering what such interactions and values consist of, and how they are cultivated and maintained. Some significant ways in which these integrative interactions and values have been conceived include the following.

classic sociological concepts

The rise of sociology paralleled the growth of the metropolis, the modern gigantic city. Many of the classic sociological theories addressing social cohesion not surprisingly traced the disjuncture between small scale, relatively isolated communities and complex, urban social forms. Some of the most salient concepts and theories include:

Ferdinand Tönnies’ notions of Gemeinschaft (social solidarity based on commonality of bonds of sentiment, experiences, sense of place and purpose, identity, emotional commitments and values along with dense social networks and regular person to person relationships) and Gesellschaft (characterised by impersonal and superficial relationships, isolated lives, normlessness and heterogeneous identifications): in both social formations a kind of social cohesion is maintained, but by qualitatively different means (in the case of the former, consensus is promoted by informal institutions especially family and peer group; in the latter, social solidarity is governed by formal authority).

Émile Durkheim’s ideas concerning social systems characterised either by ‘mechanical solidarity’ (common values, beliefs and experiences enabling persons to cooperate successfully) or ‘organic solidarity’ (social integration maintained through interdependence; that is, despite individualism and a complex division of labour, a kind of collective conscience still rests in shared principles and expectations -- embodied, for instance, in law and the market).

Talcott Parsons’ theories of normative integration. Here, a society’s norms, values and morality, sanctions, roles and behaviours are highly internalized and institutionalized throughout the society (in these ways parallel to traits of Gemeinschaft and ‘mechanical solidarity’). It has been commonly assumed in some quarters of traditional sociology that the possibilities for normative integration decrease as the size and complexity of society increase.

It is interesting to note that in many of the currently common calls for renewing social cohesion (such as mentioned at the outset of this paper), the images of cohesion invoked are usually of a rather romantic, homogenous ‘mechanical solidarity’ sort. [And it is ironic, Alisdair Rogers (personal communication) points out, that post-industrial societies look nostalgically towards rural societies for their images of social cohesion, while these are the very societies from which so many presumed social-fabric-threatening immigrants come.] Many people who are pining for a warm vision of social cohesion (exemplified in some forms of communitarianism) often forget -- or choose to overlook? -- the possibilities of heterogeneous cohesion described by Gesellschaft and ‘organic solidarity’. Within the latter, complex model, social cohesion is seen to be achieved through specialization yet interdependence and reciprocity of individual social actors and segments, each somehow contributing to the whole.

In the metropolitan city, the two very general kinds of social cohesion might coexist. Individuals living within the overarching, heterogeneous social system may form communities which serve functions like those of smaller scale societies (this is often said to be the case among immigrants and ethnic minorities; see Bensman & Vidich 1995). Parsons (1960) himself raised the possibility of observing the two modes of cohesion together in ‘diffuse solidarity’ whereby a complex and functionally differentiated social system is nevertheless integrated through attachment to abstract, common normative values.

The definition, formulation, inculcation and maintenance of common values which bind people together are inherently political processes. This brings us, then, to a number of political ideas and models which help us think about what social cohesion might be, where it is located, and what it involves.

key political concepts

Providing for the union of people with diverse interests and identities is much of what modern politics is about. The ways which have been used politically to provide some sort of union, of course, are myriad (from authoritarian stamp, through ruling class hegemony, to democratic pluralism). The following concepts refer to some critical sites where, or ideologies within which, social cohesion has been sought through overtly political means.

civil society

Karl Deutsch (1957) importantly described the nature of social cohesion afforded by a united political community, a cohesion indicated by the cultivation of mutual loyalties or ‘we-feeling’, trust, successful prediction of behaviour and the ability people to engage in cooperative action. Such ideas are today increasingly invoked in terms of civil society. However, in many current discussions surrounding the concept it is often not clear to what extent this is located with reference to the state, the market economy, political participation by individual agents, their capacity for political self-organisation, or simply everything and everyone -- ‘the people’ -- not regarded as part of the state (see Calhoun 1994a).

Michael Walzer (1992: 89) has described civil society broadly as ‘the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks -- formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology -- that fill this space.’ These networks include unions, churches, political parties, social movements, cooperatives, and ‘societies for promoting or preventing this and that’ (Ibid.: 90). In this way civil society, although a foggy concept, refers to a realm of concrete solidarities. It is through such networks and the multiplicity of peoples activities which they provide that, ideally, state power is held in check. Therefore ‘A democratic civil society,’ Walzer (Ibid.: 105) suggests, ‘is one controlled by its members, not through a single process of self-determination but through a large number of different and uncoordinated processes.’ In keeping with these ideals, calls for the promotion of civic renewal and civil society are often made by way of urging greater participation and ‘active citizenship’ through voluntary associations and service (see below).

social capital

Another theoretical notion describing an important dimension of social cohesion is social capital. The term has recently been used most notably by Robert Putnam (1993: 167) to describe ‘features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions.’ Putnam (Ibid.: 173) argues that ‘networks of civic engagement [such as neighbourhood associations, choral societies, co-operatives, sports clubs, mass-based parties] are an essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to co-operate for mutual benefit.’ Moreover, these features can be cultivated, he argues, by social and political institutions or ‘virtuous circles’ which in turn serve to promote efficiency and economic dynamism. Social capital, in other words, can be seen as the dynamic ingredients or mechanisms comprising a thriving civil society.

nation-state, national identity and nationalism

Whereas civil society and social capital are concepts describing facets of the context and functions of social cohesion, notions surrounding the nation refer to characteristics instilling a special kind of social cohesion. The idea of modern nation-state is one which, in its most totalizing form, sees the culture of a society, its political boundaries and apparatus, and its collective identity as reflective of one another, forming one imagined, homogeneous socio-cultural-political whole (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983). In conjunction with the construct of the nation-state, national identity -- a sense of belonging to that whole -- is both stimulated by and expressed through symbols (including flags, anthems, heroes) and secular rituals (such as the opening of parliament and memorial day parades).

Subsequently, underpinning the social bond of ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1983) invoked by ‘the nation’, is nationalism -- the socio-psychological element or ‘ideology that produces and reproduces nations’ (Billig 1995a). More than just some sort of political rhetoric or occasional collective practices, however, the most common manifestations of nationalism -- what Michael Billig (1995b) deems ‘banal nationalism’ -- are embedded in consciousness through day-to-day activities, routine symbols and habits of language. The idea of the nation (or ‘ethnonation’) becomes a non-rational, indeed emotional, category (Connor 1993). Hence in popular thinking, the nation is thought of as the ‘natural’ identity of every person, and the form of social cohesion which goes with it is conceived as people’s most integral.

normative political philosophies:

Marxism, welfarism, liberalism, communitarianism and associationalism

Some of the key political philosophies which have held sway in Western societies each carry a specific model of social cohesion. Within Marxism emphasis is put on modes of collective consciousness which are the product of the division of labour. Subsequently, a core form of social cohesion said to arise is that of class solidarity bolstered through the struggle against exploitation and material inequality.

In what has been termed welfarism (equated with Marshallian social citizenship; Marshall 1950), which emerged in many European states after the Second World War, the cohesion of society was considered to be possible only through ensuring a baseline of political and economic equality for its members. This led to the institutionalization of mass, uniform provision of social services and financial assistance. In most of the political systems which emerged around either Marxism or welfarism, matters of social cohesion were largely in the hands of a strong central state. Such a ‘top-down’ system was seen as the most assured manner of maintaining solid social cohesion.

The tenets of traditional liberalism have long been held up as an antithesis to collectivist and statist frameworks for bolstering social cohesion. In liberalism, there is a premium on the freedom of the individual and his/her ability to choose from the maximum number of options. Cohesion is presumed to flow from mutual respect of individual rights and persons pursuing their own ends in parallel. In some forms of neo-liberal thought which gained much ground in the 1980s, these ideals have been increasingly poised in terms of capitalism and the marketplace: individual citizens and their interests have come to be described largely by way of entrepreneurs and consumers, goods and quantifiable services. Social cohesion left to the laissez-faire of market transactions.

Now given a host of socio-economic indicators pointing to areas of failure in both collectivist (Marxist, welfarist) and individualist (liberal/neo-liberal) political systems, there are increasing signs of rapprochement, or merging, between the two (see for instance Hutton 1995). In Britain, public policy think-tanks promoting the idea of ‘stakeholding’, and especially the manifesto of New Labour, are often-cited examples of this trend which not surprisingly irritates both the political Left and Right.

Another political philosophy which is sometimes regarded as a response to liberalism is communitarianism (see for instance Etzioni 1995). It rejects liberal individualism as being overly atomistic and instrumental. Communitarians believe we all have (or should have) a deep bond to a particular sort of (usually small scale) social group, a bond which in turn is supported by the group’s values. Advocates of communitarian philosophy wish to see policies supporting the creation and maintenance of strong communities based around what, in this view, are thought to be the foundations of civil society: families, churches, schools and neighbourhoods. It should be stressed that ‘communitarianism’, and the set of values which are regularly associated with it, is such a broad rubric that it can be said to describe the views of members of both the liberal-left and conservative-right (cf. Bader 1995).

Another alternative model not far from communitarianism is associationalism, which advocates the democratic value of cultivating a widespread presence of ‘little associations’ of voluntary participation based on a wide range of possible criteria (cf. Putnam’s ‘networks of civic engagement’). The idea is that, if provided with the appropriate degree of resources and public authority, a variety of local associations could provide the common values, direction, services and activities for ‘bottom-up’ community building and, thereby, wider social cohesion (see for instance Wuthnow 1991, Walzer 1992, Hirst 1994). Associationalism, it is argued, can provide for much greater flexibility of individual and group identification as well as facilitate more direct mechanisms for voicing collective concerns. Associationalism, in this sense, would provide for a kind of heterogeneous solidarity as both differentiation (allowing for diverse identities and interests) and collective values (democracy based on respecting the views of small groups) are promoted. Associationalism offers a kind of middle path which challenges the strategy of collective welfarism (which ignores specific needs and values or groups of citizens) without embracing liberal individualism (which provides no real mechanism or incentive for social solidarity). Further, in Gregor McLennan’s (1995: 85) view, associationalism offers ‘a refreshing and concrete recipe for achieving civic responsibility without social uniformity, and mutualism without communalism.’

With regard to their ability to foster forms of social cohesion, all of the above-mentioned political concepts and philosophies have both merits and drawbacks which continue to be debated among philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. Such debates will have little meaning, however, without due consideration of the present-day conditions leading to the breakdown -- in popular perception or lived actuality -- of social cohesion in contemporary Western societies.

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