

New Chinese Immigrants to New Zealand: a PRC Dimension

Phoebe H. Li

University of Auckland, New Zealand

Since the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ policy in 1978, China has gradually removed restrictions against Chinese citizens going overseas for personal reasons (*yin si chuguo* 因私出国). Major policy changes include: 1) the introduction of the Provisional Regulation on Control of Self-funded Overseas Education (关于自费出国留学的暂行规定) in 1984 ; 2) the promulgation of the Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Citizens (*gongmin chu ru jing guanli fa* 公民出入境管理法) in 1986; 3) the implementation of the Provisional Method for Control of Citizens’ Self-funded Overseas Tours (*gongmin zifei chuguo luyou guanli zan xing banfa* 公民自费出国旅游管理暂行办法) in 1997; 4) the exertion of the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education (*zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding* 自费留学中介服务管理规定) in 1999; and 5) the end of the requirement for a foreign invitation (*yaoqing han* 邀请函) and a prior approval for departure (*chu jing ka* 出境卡) for passport application in 2002. Before these policy changes, mainland Chinese were generally not allowed to travel overseas. These moves have greatly reduced the barrier preventing Chinese citizens from leaving the country and have permitted the new wave of Chinese international migration. For instance, in 1997, the total number of Chinese citizens going overseas was 5.32 million;¹ a decade later, in 2007, there were almost 80 million national border

¹ Data from the *Official Report of China Tourism Industry* for 1998, for more detail, see http://www.lw23.com/paper_107769631_4 (accessed 19 April 2010).

crossings by mainland Chinese.² These Chinese nationals departed for most parts of the world and comprised a wide range of permanent migrants and temporary migrants such as international students, contract workers and tourists, of whom many were potential permanent migrants.

This paper aims to present a profile of the PRC immigrants to New Zealand. The making of a specific PRC Chinese migrant community in the country is closely associated with major policy changes in China as noted above, and in New Zealand, a country beginning to abolish its race-based immigration policy in the late 1980s. The first part of this paper uses New Zealand immigration and census data to analyse two large influxes of PRC immigrants to New Zealand, during the mid-1990s and the early 2000s respectively. The second employs quantitative and qualitative data acquired from analysing the New Zealand Chinese-language media, which reveals recent PRC migrants' perceptions of New Zealand and their aspirations in the country.

Statistical analysis of PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand

As one of the well-established former British colonies, New Zealand, the so-called “little Britain in the South”, historically applied a hidden “whiter than white” policy even stricter than Australia’s open one. This means that in the past, immigrants to New Zealand were almost exclusively taken from the United Kingdom (Brooking and

² Data from China’s Ministry of Public Security, for more details, see <http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n84147/n84211/n84424/index.html> (accessed 15 December 2009).

Rabel 1995, 36). A radical change began with the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act, which abolished the admission of immigrants based on their race (New Zealand Dept. of Statistics 1989, 202). The introduction of this Act took place within the specific historical context that New Zealand faced a diminishing economic and political alliance with Britain since the latter had joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Given the loss of this guaranteed export market, it became critical for New Zealand to seek new opportunities in Asia, a region geographically closer and increasingly prosperous. Jim Bolger (1992, 20), then Prime Minister, openly admitted that from the perspective of the New Zealand government, a policy of facilitating immigration from Asia was the ideal mechanism to secure new trading partners, to stimulate the New Zealand economy, and thus best to serve the national interests. The late 1970s was also the period when major flows of young and better educated New Zealanders started emigrating to Australia (Hugo, 2004). In short, a new policy with a focus on attracting talented immigrants or valuable human capital to New Zealand from non-traditional source countries was an essential process of “replacement migration”. The resulting 1987 Immigration Act has facilitated a strong wave of immigration from Asia.

In 1991, New Zealand followed in the steps of Canada and Australia and introduced the ‘Points System’, which most importantly brought in a new ‘general skills’ category of immigrants. Applicants in this category were approved for residency on the basis of their points awarded for key factors such as age, employability,




Chart 1: Top five source countries for residence approvals (data from New Zealand Immigration Service).

qualifications, work history and English skills. Such specific criteria were perceived as a great improvement over the general list of prioritised occupations as designated in the 1987 Immigration Act. Since then, the ‘Points System’ has been further modified; a major change occurred in 2003, which focused on encouraging international students to transit from study to work and residence in New Zealand.

Data from New Zealand Immigration shows that the ‘general skills’ category has been the main path for the PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand.

In New Zealand, there are two distinct Chinese communities. The old one started in the 1860s with gold miners originally from Canton in southern China. They shared a lot in common with the early Chinese sojourners in the United States, Canada and Australia during the same period and were victims of a series of legislation against




Chart 2: Composition of the New Zealand Chinese.

Chinese immigration (Ng 1993; Ip 1995; Murphy 2001). The new Chinese community by and large results from the 1987 Immigration Act and other succeeding policy changes. Most newcomers are urbanised professionals and affluent entrepreneurs with their families from East or Southeast Asia. To begin with, immigrants from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and later Taiwan dominated this new Chinese community. However, following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China has become the leading source of ethnic Chinese immigrants to New Zealand; over the past ten years or so, China has been one of the top five countries for immigrants to New Zealand as depicted in Chart 1.

Chart 2 illustrates the composition of the Chinese population in New Zealand according to the most recent census conducted in 2006; it shows that PRC Chinese now comprise more than half of the New Zealand Chinese population, accounting for




Chart 3: Two large influxes of PRC immigrants to New Zealand (data from New Zealand Immigration Service)

3.4% of the 4.4 million New Zealand population. Chart 3 depicts that within the PRC Chinese community, the first large influx of immigrants to New Zealand took place during the mid 1990s; most of these people arrived directly from China under the “general skills” category (Henderson 2003). Chart 3 also shows that there has been a sharp increase in PRC immigration to New Zealand since the early 2000s.

In comparison with the previous arrivals of the mid 1990s, the recent immigrants from China are a very different cohort, including two major groups. One group comprises former Chinese international students in New Zealand. Unlike the United States, Canada and Australia, New Zealand did not experience a significant influx of post-Tiananmen mainland Chinese students-turned-immigrants (Zhou, Chen and Cai 2006, 46; Gao 2006, 154), because the total number of Chinese students in New Zealand

then was hardly noticeable (International Policy and Development Unit, 2002).

However, since China liberalised its international education market in 1999 as a result of the implementation of the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education (*zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding* 自费留学中介服务管理规定),³ New Zealand has quickly become one of the most attractive countries for Chinese students, and since then China has been the leading source country for international students to New Zealand. Chart 4 shows the top five source countries for international students to New Zealand between 1997 and 2007. In the financial year ending in 2002, more than 40,000 Chinese students were granted a permit to study in New Zealand. Although the number of Chinese students has decreased since, it still remains more than 20,000 each year. As noted earlier, since 2003, the New Zealand government has encouraged international students to become migrants once they complete their studies. Chinese students are the largest group benefiting from this policy change (Merwood 2007, 35). The other large group of recent immigrants are Chinese business people, who are the largest source of business migrants to New Zealand since 2000.⁴ The total number of PRC investors was particularly large; between 2000 and 2008, more than 63,000 Chinese nationals from the PRC were granted permanent residence; among them, 7,286 were investors out of the 9,672 business migrants. Chart 5 illustrates the changing pattern of PRC business

³ The Chinese government did not intervene in the international education market before this, and illegal operations and frauds were rampant. This new regulation ensures that only qualified and licensed intermediary agencies are eligible to provide consulting service to self-funded students studying overseas. Statistics from China's Ministry of Education show that the total number of such students grew rapidly from 32,293 in 2000 to 128,700 in 2007, almost a four-fold increase. For more details, see <http://www.moe.edu.cn> (accessed 21 January 2010).

⁴ In New Zealand, business residence covers six categories; statistics show that PRC business immigrants primarily fell into the Investor Category and the Entrepreneur Category.




Chart 4: Top source countries for international students to New Zealand (data from New Zealand Immigration Service).

immigrants to New Zealand between 2000 and 2007.⁵

Since New Zealand, like the United States, Canada and Australia, also applies a principle of “centre of gravity” for family reunification, PRC migrants in skilled and business streams have accordingly become a source of more immigrants from China; they have sponsored their spouses and young children, parents and siblings to immigrate to New Zealand in the family stream. Chart 6 is a summary of the data of PRC immigrants to the country between 1997 and 2009.

⁵ For more detail, see <http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/> (accessed 16 December 2009).




Chart 5: PRC business migrants to New Zealand (data from New Zealand Immigration).

According to the 2006 census, 70% of PRC Chinese lived in Auckland, the largest urban area in New Zealand; the rest cluster in other large cities in the country such as Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton. In fact, Auckland is not only attractive to these newcomers from China, but to all immigrants to New Zealand. The 2006 census also shows that almost 40% of the Auckland population were immigrants. After Toronto (with 44-45% immigrant population), Auckland is among the cities with the largest proportion of migrants in the world (Spoonley 2009).




Chart 6: Streams of PRC immigrants to New Zealand 1997-2009 (data from New Zealand Immigration Service).

Within Auckland, the PRC Chinese migrants' settlement experiences have been varied. The earlier arrivals of the mid-1990s encountered a very difficult time in finding suitable employment in New Zealand because their academic and professional qualifications and work experience obtained in China were not well-recognised in New Zealand (Henderson 2003). Those who managed to find a job were predominantly holding unskilled and menial positions (Ho, Bedford and Goodwin 1999). In contrast, the recent arrivals are generally in a much better economic position. The business migrants are certainly affluent, and the bulk of skilled migrants have been granted residence largely because they have been employed in New Zealand; many of them work in professional fields such as IT, accounting and engineering. In addition, many of the former international students are from wealthy families in China. In many ways, these recent arrivals are among the most immediate

beneficiaries of China's accelerated economic growth since the mid-1990s, following Deng Xiaoping's influential southern tour in 1992, which led the Chinese government's endorsement of the "socialist market economy" into a new era,⁶ and has generated a considerable number of newly emerged middle and upper class people in the country.

As the 'new rich' from China, the tens of thousands of recent PRC migrants including international students have had significant impacts on the Chinese community economy in New Zealand, which now appears prosperous. PRC Chinese-run businesses now range from small businesses like retail stores, restaurants and computer gaming rooms, etc., to sizeable property development. Walking along commercial streets in certain suburbs in Auckland (such as Dominion Road, central parts of Pakuranga, Mt Albert and New Lynn) with a greater density of ethnic Chinese immigrants, Chinese tourists can see various businesses signs written in simplified Chinese characters, which signify that their ownership is probably PRC Chinese, since most overseas Chinese including Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese use the traditional system of Chinese characters.

Recent PRC migrants in diasporic Chinese mediasphere

The booming Chinese community economy has also boosted the Chinese-language

⁶ Subsequent to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, Deng Xiaoping lost his absolute power as official leader of the Chinese Communist Party and retired from office. However, in early 1992 he toured Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai and made influential speeches reasserting his agenda for the further reform of China's economy. This was followed by China's introduction of stock markets, the expansion of foreign investments, the privatisation of state enterprises, etc.. Ever since, the 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' has become the new ideological engine driving the Chinese economy.

media in New Zealand including newspapers, radio, television and websites. All of these media are private commercial ventures and primarily rely on advertising revenues from Chinese businesses. The author spent more than 4 years studying these media in her PhD research, which was completed last year. This PhD research is a study of the social dynamics of the current Chinese migrant community in New Zealand through a critical analysis of the Chinese-language media that serves this community. The key research questions include the following:

- 1) To what extent is the Chinese migrant community reflected by the Chinese-language media?
- 2) What role do these media play in the process of Chinese migrants' settlement and acculturation in the core society of New Zealand?
- 3) How do Chinese migrants perceive New Zealand and what kind of aspirations do Chinese migrants hold for their new lives in New Zealand?

The research was conducted through analysing the content of Chinese-language media (more than 40 issues of newspapers, nearly 200 hours of radio programmes including news and call-ins, and hundreds of news items and posts on one particular website) during the 2005 New Zealand general election, which lasted for thirteen weeks.⁷ In

⁷ New Zealand runs its general election every three years. Once 18 years or older, a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident who has lived in the country for one year or more without leaving the country, is required by law to register on the Parliamentary Electoral Roll. Voting is not compulsory. New Zealand has been applying an electoral system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) since 1996. MMP was designed to enhance the political opportunities of small parties, giving representation to all those crossing the threshold of 5% of the overall vote or winning an electorate seat. With the party vote determining the overall distribution of seats, electorate MPs and list MPs (according to the rankings chosen by party hierarchy) together comprise the New Zealand Parliament. Larger parties that fail to win a majority of the seats in Parliament have to work with small parties, which may strongly influence the construction of the government. The period of the 2005 New Zealand general election was defined as starting from 25th July 2005, when the Prime Minister Helen Clark officially announced the date of this election, to 21st October 2005, shortly after the new coalition government was formed. This period was thirteen weeks in total.

addition to this, the author also acquired qualitative data from two focus groups among the Chinese audience and a number of one-to-one interviews with Chinese media personnel.

The findings of this research suggest that these Chinese media mainly serve newly-arrived PRC migrants and closely reflect the current development of this particular community, not only of these migrants' settlement and their economic activities as depicted in advertisements, but also of their perceptions of New Zealand. These perceptions in turn point to these migrants' aspirations for their new life in New Zealand. Despite their lack of experience of democratic elections in China (O'Brien and Li 2000; Oi and Scott 2000; Shi 2000), many recent PRC migrants showed a strong interest in observing and participating in New Zealand politics. They used ethnic Chinese media as an alternative public sphere (Habermas 1989) to New Zealand mainstream media to address and discuss certain issues that they were highly interested in and concerned with. During the 2005 election, fifteen Chinese media companies across New Zealand even organised a symposium together in Auckland, which spokesmen for eight major political parties were invited to attend and to answer questions from a Chinese audience on site; at the same time one Chinese radio station also took questions through call-ins from a wider audience.

Among many issues they discussed, two main themes can be identified clearly. One was about supporting ethnic Chinese politicians standing for two conservative parties,

one of whom immigrated to New Zealand from China in the early 1990s. Many recent PRC migrants held a viewpoint such as, “Only people (candidates) who share the same background and experiences as us can understand our feelings, and will be able to speak on our behalf in Parliament”(26 August 2005, *New Zealand Chinese Herald*). Having realised that their favourite candidate would not be able to enter Parliament, some PRC migrants were greatly disappointed, but emphasised their achievement; for instance, one noted, “...we Chinese have been mobilised to participate in New Zealand politics; we therefore have our political influence on the mainstream society” (22 September 2005, *New Zealand Chinese Herald*). In fact, their votes significantly contributed to one small party’s return to parliament, as the party leader admitted (Li, P. 2009, 178).

As they gave overwhelming support to conservative parties, the other theme was criticism of the centre-left Labour Party which was then in power. A large number of recent PRC migrants disapproved of the Labour government’s ‘high’ taxation policy and ‘massive expenditure’ on welfare such as state housing and other financial support to low-income earners and beneficiaries. They considered that such expenditure was too generous and would impede New Zealand’s economic development, which they thought sluggish in comparison with China’s rapid growth. In response to their favorite candidate’s loss and Labour’s victory in this election, some recent PRC migrants even used call-ins on Chinese radio as a platform to deliver accusation against elderly Chinese migrants who received benefits; a pro-

Labour Chinese radio programme host originally from Malaysia was under severe personal attack by some audience members and was even labelled as a traitor to ‘the Chinese community’.

Being from the newly emerged middle and upper classes in China, recent PRC migrants hold conservative views that should be also understood by reference to current China, a society in which uneven distribution of wealth and social inequalities are widespread. The Gini coefficient is commonly used as an indicator for measuring the overall degree of income inequality of a country. The danger line for the Gini coefficient as defined by the Chinese government is 40 (Shirk 2007, 31); China reached the ‘yellow light’ Gini level of 45 in 2001 (*China Daily*, 20 September 2005). Although the Chinese government has recently introduced a new social security system,⁸ receiving benefits challenges China’s conventional value system, which always rewards hardworking people and condemns hangers-on. While a new social security system is in the making in China, those in severe poverty still suffer from institutionalised social discrimination and stigmatisation. Therefore, attaining social equality and justice through redistribution of social resources is still an alien ideology for recent PRC migrants. By contrast, within the developed world, the welfare state is an accepted mechanism to coordinate social integration and maintain political stability

(Li, Feng, and Gizelis 2008,10; also see Wilensky 1975; Pampel and Williamson

⁸ At the end of 1997, the Chinese government introduced the Minimum Living Standard Allowance. Shortly afterwards, a new social security system aiming to cover a wider range of Chinese citizens was implemented under the management of the newly established Ministry of Labour and Social Security. However, branch offices of this ministry in all provinces across China were finally set up by the end of 1999. Hussain (2007, 112) comments that, “both rural and urban social security systems are highly decentralised”. For instance, social insurance and pension schemes cover only 7 percent of the total rural population in China (ibid.,110).

1988; Pierson 1991). New Zealand has been a well-established welfare state since the 1930s.⁹

Recent PRC migrants' ideological distance from the core society of New Zealand helps to explain their embrace of Chinese nationalism. A number of researchers have argued that the revival of this nationalism is closely associated with China's fast economic growth in recent years (e.g. Fewsmith, 2001; Gries, 2004; Hughes 2006; Zweig 2002). During the 2005 election, Chinese nationalism among many recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand was clearly shown by their ill-feeling towards the Green Party¹⁰ as Labour's close ally, and their enthusiastic celebration of China's success in launching its first manned spacecraft. In their view, China's current prosperity was the basis for funding such a costly and ambitious project, which marked their motherland's leading role in advanced science and technology in the world.

Although this author did not conduct a specific study of recent PRC migrants' political choices during the 2008 general election, their preference for conservative parties was indicated by the results of two surveys by the *New Zealand Chinese Herald* and New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR)¹¹. In 2008, subsequent to the riot in Tibet in March, recent PRC migrants' patriotic sentiment

⁹ In New Zealand, the idea of government provision of social security can be traced back much earlier. The first Liberal government introduced the old age pensions in 1898.

¹⁰ Being centre-left, the Green Party believes in 'post-materialist' values and advocates liberal views such as the protection of women's and minorities' rights. The party often criticises China's environmental damage caused by its rapid industrialisation; it also openly expresses sympathy of both the exiled Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama and the recent East Turkestan independence movement in Xinjiang.

¹¹ The New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR) was founded in February 2008 by a group of recent business migrants from China.

towards China was strongly reflected in their rallies (also joined by Chinese international students) in Auckland and Wellington to protest "reporting of untruths" about Tibet by New Zealand mainstream media in order to support the Beijing Olympics;¹² it was noticeable that rallies of this kind also took place in Britain, France, the United States, Australia and many other countries during the same period (Li, D. 2009, 200-4). Other than their Chinese nationalistic rallies, a large number of recent PRC migrants were also seen present in an anti-crime protest in South Auckland in July 2008, in which more than 10,000 Asian immigrants participated; it was one of the largest demonstrations in New Zealand in recent years.¹³

Overall, compared with the early arrivals of the mid 1990s, recent PRC migrants in New Zealand seem highly assertive and have demonstrated some clear signs of political mobilisation. Drawn from China's 'new rich', these migrants and their political activities in New Zealand may be theoretically understood by reference to economic growth and social modernisation (e.g. Huntington 1991; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) that has emerged in China in recent years. There have been numerous protests by the middle-class in some large cities (Shen 2008); for instance, Xiamen residents opposed building a chemical plant next to their neighbourhood in 2007,¹⁴ and Shanghai residents marched against the maglev railway

¹² For more details, see http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10500330; http://www.nzherald.co.nz/olympic-games/news/article.cfm?c_id=502&objectid=10506170 (accessed 19 February 2010).

¹³ This protest happened shortly after several brutal homicides of Asian immigrants in south Auckland. People participating in this protest had great concern about New Zealand's law and order, which they perceived tolerated criminals, but did not protect the interests of victims. They also considered themselves as the target of racism. For more details, see http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_national_story_skin/1890726 (accessed 8 July 2008).

¹⁴ For more details, see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/30/eng20070530_379187.html and

in 2008.¹⁵ Nevertheless, their perceptions of disadvantaged social groups including low-income earners and beneficiaries suggest that these people's understanding of western democracy, such as New Zealand, is biased because of their privileged social status in China, where the development of a civil society is still at a slow pace (Li, P. 2009, 178). There is abundant evidence of this: redundant workers and vulnerable pensioners from former state-owned enterprises held frequent protests in urban China to fight for their rights; the *Hukou* system¹⁶ limits the right of rural Chinese citizens to live in cities; most migrant workers do not have contracts with their employers, and thus obtain no legal protection from workplace injuries, sickness leave and unpredictable redundancy, and of course receive no pensions (NBS 2005, cited in Hussain 2007, 111). In contrast with their counterparts in China, citizens or long-term residents within a democratic welfare state have legally protected rights to participate in the processes of decision-making about balancing a society's economic growth, political stability and social equality.

Concluding remarks

In summary, the PRC immigrants to New Zealand, especially the recent arrivals, show some distinct features of the new wave of international migration from China.

While millions of individuals have left China to seek a better life in different parts of

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/30/america/pollution.php> (accessed 1 March 2008).

¹⁵ For more details, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7188122.stm> (accessed 1 March 2008).

¹⁶ 'Hukou' is a record of household registration, which officially identifies a Chinese citizen as an urban or rural resident. China originally implemented the 'Hukou' system in the 1950s. Under this system, rural residents are strictly prohibited from living in cities without an official urban residency permit. They are not entitled to the same social welfare as urban residents. This system has institutionally differentiated the Chinese citizens into two worlds. Thanks to China's economic boom, the system has been eroded since the 1980s, with the rural population increasingly leaving the land to find jobs and a better life in many large Chinese cities.

the world since the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ policy, the changing social and political contexts in China may have significant impacts on these emigrants. With China’s rise as a new economic giant and the revival of Chinese nationalism, a consideration of ‘the China factor’ may be of particular importance in examining recent PRC immigrants’ perceptions of their host societies and their corresponding behaviours within those societies in both developing and developed worlds. Within such a context, the Chinese development model known as the Beijing Consensus (Ramo 2004) deserves some special attention when we examine the recent PRC migrants.

In the view of many critics, the Beijing Consensus asserts fundamental values of authoritarian political governance, but downplays Western notions of liberalisation and social justice. Since this paper aims to present only a profile of the PRC immigrants to New Zealand, it would be beyond its scope to discuss further recent PRC migrants’ political participation in other countries, whether similar to or different from that of New Zealand. Nevertheless, findings about the recent PRC migrants in New Zealand may provide a reference point for examining and comparing their counterparts in other countries.

List of references

Bolger, J. B. 1992. “New Zealand and Asia.” Speech made at Massey University, 19 August, in Palmerston North, New Zealand. In *New Zealand External Relations and Trade Record (1992-1993)* vol. 1:3. Wellington: Ministry of External Relations and Trade.

Brooking, T. and R. Rabel. 1995. "Neither British nor Polynesian: a Brief History of New Zealand's Other Immigrants." In *Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples*, ed. S. W. Greif, 23-49. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Department of Statistics. 1989. *The New Zealand Official Yearbook 1988-1989*. Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer.

Fewsmith, J. 2001. *China since Tiananmen: the Politics of Transition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gao, J. "Radio-activated Business and Power: a Case Study of 3CW Melbourne Chinese Radio". In *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications, and Commerce*, ed. W. Sun, 150-77. London: Routledge.

Gries, P. H. 2004. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Habermas, J. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Henderson, A. 2003. "Untapped Talents: the Employment and Settlement Experiences of Skilled Chinese in New Zealand." In *Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand*, ed. M. Ip, 141-64. Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Ho, E., R. Bedford and J. Goodwin. 1999. "Self-Employment among Chinese Immigrants in New Zealand." In *Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference held in Wellington, 26-27 November 1998*, ed. P. S Morrison, 276-86. Wellington: Institute of Geography, Victoria University of Wellington.

Hughes, C. R., 2006. *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*. New York: Routledge.

Hugo, G. 2004. "New Zealanders in Australia in 2001." *New Zealand Population Review* 30 (1/2): 61-92.

Huntington, S. P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hussain, A. 2007. "Social Security in Transition." In *Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and Changing Patterns of Inequality*, ed. V. Shu. and C. Wong, 96-116. London: Routledge.

Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

International Policy and Development Unit. 2002. *Foreign Fee-Paying Student Statistics to 2001*. Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Education.

<http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/publications/series/15260/5147> (accessed 1 March 2008).

Ip, M. 1995. "Chinese New Zealanders: Old settlers and New Immigrants." In *Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples*, ed. S. W. Greif, 161-99 and 326-333. Palmerston North: Dunsmore Press.

Li, D. 2009. *Haiwai huarwen wangluo meiti – kua wenhua yujing*. Beijing: Qinghua University Press.

Li, J., Y. Feng, Y., and I. Gizelis. 2008. "China's New Social Security System in the Making: Problems and Prospects." *Journal of Public Administration* 31: 5-23.

Li, P. H. 2009. "*A Virtual Chinatown: the Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand*." PhD diss., University of Auckland.

Merwood, P. 2007. *International Students: Studying and Staying on in New Zealand*. Wellington: Department of Labour.

<http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/international-students/>(accessed 21 September 2008).

Murphy, N. 2001. "The Legislative Response to Chinese Immigration in New Zealand 1881-1944." In *The Overseas Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions*, Proceedings of the Symposium held in Taipei, 6-7 January 2001, ed. H. Chan, A. Curthoys and N. Chiang, 82-90. Canberra: Centre for the Study of the Chinese South Diaspora, Australian National University.

Ng, J. 1993. *Windows on a Chinese Past*. Dunedin: Otago Heritage Books.

O'Brien, K. J. and L. Li. 2000. "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China." *The China Quarterly* 162: 465-89.

Oi, J. C. and S. Rozelle. 2000. "Elections and Power: the Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages." *The China Quarterly* 162: 513-39.

Pampel, F.C. and J. B. Williamson. 1988. "Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950-1980." *American Journal of Sociology* 93: 1424-56.

Pierson, C. 1991. *Beyond the Welfare State? the New Political Economy of Welfare*.

University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49(2): 155–83.

Ramo, J. C. 2004. *The Beijing Consensus*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

Shi, T. 2000. "Cultural Values and Democracy in the People's Republic of China." *The China Quarterly* 162: 540-59.

Shirk, S. L. 2007. *China: Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spoonley, P. 2009. "Cultural Transformation: New Zealand Challenges and Responses, Multiculturalism in a Globalising World – Different Perspectives." Proceedings of the *Cultural Identities in a Globalising World* workshop held in Wellington, 17 April 2009.

Wilensky, H. L. 1975. *The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zhou, M., W. Chen and G. Cai. 2006. "Chinese-language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada." In *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications, and Commerce*, ed. W. Sun, 42-74. New York: Routledge.

Zweig, D. 2002. *Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages*. London: Cornell University Press.