Human Smuggling: Global Responses to a Global Phenomenon
This paper will attempt to look, from a global perspective, at four aspects of today's human smuggling debate:
- first, its world-wide reach;
- second, why it is a growth industry;
- third, some policy options to address it; and
- fourth, collaborative approaches to achieve progress in curbing human smuggling.
As we are all fond of saying, hard data on human smuggling are by definition very difficult, if not impossible, to come by. There are all kinds of reasons for that. The first is the clandestine nature of the activity itself. And of course, there is the very basic problem that there are - as yet - no universal definitions of what terms like "human smuggling" and "migrant trafficking" mean, much less how clear the distinctions between them really are on the ground.
On that score, let me say that this paper is not going to go into detail on the terminology question. That is a subject of much current - and complicated - debate, and the distinctions between the two terms are being codified in two Protocols to the new Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. (Note: Both the Convention and the Protocols were scheduled to be considered by the UN General Assembly in New York the day after this presentation was made, and were. This paved the way for them to be opened for signature at an intergovernmental conference in Palermo (Italy) in December 2000.) In a word, though, and at the risk of oversimplification, I will characterize the distinction in shorthand as one that hinges on coercion and abuse. "Trafficking" is increasingly accepted to define a phenomenon involving abusive, coercive trade and exploitation - in slavery-like conditions - of individuals who are not necessarily international migrants. "Smuggling", on the other hand, is focused on the illicit transport of migrants across international borders. And while the smuggled may suffer mistreatment, too - a fact we should not forget - they voluntarily turn to smugglers, and are not recruited or coerced.
For those interested in going into these definitional issues in greater detail - and it really is a very interesting debate - I would highly recommend a new study by John Salt and Jennifer Hogarth, of University College London. It appears in a volume entitled Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe which has just been published by IOM and is available for purchase worldwide through the United Nations publications sales netowork.
For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on "smuggling".
Hard global data on migrant smuggling are non-existent, for the reasons I just mentioned. There are "guesstimates" about global trafficking in women, about irregular migration, about smuggling in Europe - but no global smuggling statistics. Nevertheless, we live in a real world where there is enough information from a variety of sources to know that migrant smuggling is significant in size, and we can also paint a broad-brush picture of what human smuggling looks like on a global scale.
IOM has developed a map (Note: see Annex) to show paths and magnitudes of migrant smuggling flows worldwide. I don't pretend that it is a scientific reflection of the global situation today. But it does illustrate - based on many years' observation and research - that, for a whole range of reasons, migrant smuggling and trafficking touch practically every country in the world today - whether as a source country, a receiver or a transit zone - or increasingly, as all three at the same time.
This is a thread that will run throughout this paper.
But migrant smuggling is not a new phenomenon. Why, then, does it appear to have exploded so dramatically in terms of numbers, global reach and visibility? Well, is it really so surprising that global revolutions in information, transport, trade and investment would affect people's perceptions of their own personal situation; their knowledge of the greater world around them; and their attitudes toward migration?
Globalization has brought more and more countries, and previously remote zones of countries, into contact with the wider world. Whether drawn by what they see abroad or pushed by what they don't see at home, the potential pool of people who today would consider migrating - and who can realistically make their wish to migrate come true - has clearly increased. When these basic ingredients are mixed with one part rising expectations of a better standard of living, two parts unemployment or underemployment at home, and one part the promise of a job abroad, a powerful cocktail is the result.
The next step, then, is to look at the migration outlets. With few exceptions, legal migration opportunities have been shrinking in much of the world. Shrinking even though demand for foreign labour in some sectors of receiving country economies either has remained unchanged or has even grown as a result of an ageing and changing national labour force. Irregular migration often fills such gaps, but at a cost to society in terms of creating both an undocumented underclass and the perception of government having lost control over its borders. One result is that public pressure to crack down on irregular migration mounts - and justifiably so. But if "control" is the only policy lever that is pulled, the imbalances that feed the irregular migration flows in the first place will still remain. Nothing will have been done about the other ingredients of the migration cocktail I just referred to - except to make some of them cost more. Enter, then, the smuggler.
There have always been smugglers. What is vastly different now is the degree of sophistication required to succeed. Ironically enough, this is at least partially the result of Governments' very success in addressing earlier shortcomings or loopholes in their migration systems. Whatever the cause, though, as what is required for smugglers to succeed becomes more complicated and costly - convoluted travel arrangements, falsified documents, safe houses, etc. - the old "mom and pop" outfits increasingly are squeezed out of the market. This is where organized criminal networks move in, experienced and well equipped as many are to transport drugs and other contraband - eve if, given current incomplete evidence, one should avoid an automatic correlation between the two. Yet it is no great leap to see the case for "diversification" into a new "commodity" - people - as appears to have happened in the Balkans. And it is all the more attractive if the potential penalties are usually considerably less than for drugs, for example, while the potential profits remain huge. As much research has concluded, human smuggling is a multi-billion dollar industry.
But why, one may ask, are so many people willing to pay significant sums of money for a risky venture which they generally know is not legal? This issue - the question of why human smuggling has become a growth industry - is the second part of my presentation this morning.
Clearly, a major factor is the growing gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" - within countries, where the "have nots" see little opportunity to advance and attain their goals for themselves and their families; and between countries, as development proceeds unevenly and opportunity seems to beckon just next door or down the road. But economic opportunity is not the only factor.
Armed conflict and instability, a stifling political or social climate, an environment so despoiled that it can no longer support the livelihood of its inhabitants: all of these also figure in the mix. Networks in receiving countries play a role as well. Moreover - particularly in the case of women migrants - the breakdown of societal norms which previously militated against work outside the home (never mind outside the country), as well as the low social status and exclusion from job markets which minorities or other vulnerable groups suffer in many deteriorating economies, further encourage migration.
But what provides the most powerful enticement to turn to smugglers is the mismatch between legal migration slots and the actual demand for them. Tantalizing opportunities are on display, and the price for grabbing them - in the form of smugglers' fees - may not seem so high when put in a context of likely future earnings and human nature's tendency to rationalize away the likelihood of suffocating in a cargo container crossing the Pacific, dying of thirst in the Arizona desert, or drowning in the Straits of Gibraltar. Those things only happen to others, of course. And when stories and pictures circulate of those who have successfully navigated the smuggling route, it is even easier to think - or at least hope - that that will be the case for you, too.
Answering the question of why potential migrants are willing to turn to smugglers already hints at why smugglers are so willing to turn to this trade in people. They are exploiting a demand-driven phenomenon, not creating it. They can extract significant payments from individuals, and sometimes also from employers. Yet this is an area where fines and prison sentences are often weak or non-existent; overburdened legal systems do not give high priority to tough prosecution; potential witnesses are frequently considered first and foremost to be deportable aliens - and are deported before trials take place; and potential seizure of assets has not generally been the threat it is, for example, for drug traffickers. Consequently, this can be seen, in purely business terms, as a relatively low risk, high gain trade where the more people one moves, the more one can earn. Seen from this vantage point, it is understandable that organized transnational criminal networks seem to be moving into people smuggling and accounting for a greater percentage of it.
Having looked, then, at some of the reasons why human smuggling is now a global phenomenon, as well as why it has become such a growth industry, I would like now to move on to my third point: what can be done about it?
Even this cursory overview of the causes for human smuggling points out just how complex an issue it is. Underdevelopment and underemployment, state security, population and age structure imbalances, selective labour shortages, repressive political and social conditions, changing gender roles: all play a part, and no single one of them can truly be said to predominate. What this argues for, then, is a comprehensive and global approach to the issue - in short, making combating human smuggling part of managing migration in the broadest sense. Addressing one aspect of it at a time, in isolation and with a fix on the short term, is unlikely to have much success, as I tried to illustrate with my cocktail analogy a few minutes ago.
Let me break down into three categories what IOM would consider to be the main elements of a successful global anti-smuggling strategy. These fall under the broad headings of: preventive measures; punitive measures; and remedial measures.
First, prevention. This includes, at the very root, the need to address inadequate job creation in areas of origin in order to provide viable options for more potential migrants to stay home. In the final analysis, as one has seen in the evolution of many former large-scale emigration countries - the creation of jobs and wealth, social and political freedom and stability, and the consequent hope of a brighter future will stem out-migration over time -even if not in the immediate short term.
Equally important is getting out the message much more widely and articulately about the risks involved in irregular migration in general, and especially the real "costs" (beyond the strictly monetary) of turning to smugglers. These mass information campaigns in source countries are not a magical solution, but there is growing evidence that they can and do have an impact.
Prevention also includes, of course, looking at the "pull" factors which draw migrants to the receiving country, and smugglers to supply their services. For example, if certain sectors of the labour market are consistently unable to attract local workers and rely on immigrants, consideration should be given to creating a better match between legal immigration slots (even seasonal ones) and the real labour demand. We are of course all familiar with the adage that "there is nothing less temporary than temporary migration," but before discarding the option automatically, perhaps one should take another look at some of the more successful examples - such as here in Canada.
Finally - although I hesitate somewhat to include it here as part a "prevention" strategy, because it straddles the line between prevention and punishment - there is the need for a multi-pronged policy on return. Such a policy needs to be clear and well publicized - as well as enforced. To the extent possible, while recognizing that the law has been broken by the smuggled migrant, it should encourage voluntary return. But when voluntary return is rejected, it must also contemplate an enforceable and enforced deportation policy, and cooperation with countries of origin. Return policy can and should be humane, but the steadily escalating consequences for the smuggled individual need to be articulated and applied if the existence of a return policy is to be credibly dissuasive, and to weigh in people's migration decisions before they opt to move.
This leads me into my second group of policy elements - namely, the punitive measures. Let me elaborate on those - with a particular emphasis on measures aimed at the smugglers.
To begin with, tougher legislation is needed in most countries to criminalize migrant smuggling and to harmonize penalties internationally. The experience of the past decade has been very instructive in this field, demonstrating both the flexibility and speed of criminal networks in shifting their routes and methods in response to legislative and policy changes, as well as how the "weak link" - the country with relatively less vigorous penalties and enforcement possibilities - can quickly become a favoured transit or destination country. But the best laws in the world need to be enforced, cases need to be prosecuted, harsh sentences need to be meted out if the risk a smuggler runs is to rise and ultimately have a dissuasive effect. Here, training of border guards, the police and the judiciary is of critical importance. And that training needs to convey a two-fold message: recognition of the threat to security and orderly migration that the smugglers represent, but also recognition that the smuggled - who admittedly have broken the law and exposed themselves to legal action as a result - are also human beings with basic human rights and entitlement to humane treatment. And in this latter context, it is particularly important to reinforce the special distinction that has to be made for those who have turned to smugglers as the only option for escape from persecution, and whose right to seek asylum cannot be compromised by their having done so.
There is also the need for tighter border control measures. This means dedicating adequate resources to the task, better utilizing advanced technology (including detection equipment), and improving information sharing among the police authorities of all the countries concerned - sending, receiving and transit.
While preventive and punitive measures are working simultaneously to effect, over time, a reduction in the scale of human smuggling, there remains the issue of dealing with the smuggled. This is the third policy segment referred to earlier as the remedial. It focuses essentially on facilitating return - but with nuances.
As noted previously, departure from the receiving country should be the general goal - preferably voluntary departure, with assistance if needed. However, in our view, any return policy framework should also explicitly recognize at least the following cases for exceptional treatment:
- the first, which I have already stressed, is that of genuine asylum seekers;
- the second is when vulnerability makes return an option neither in the best interest of the individual nor of the receiving country's humanitarian tradition - in which case leave to remain on humanitarian grounds is appropriate;
- and the third is where the interests of prosecution make it mutually beneficial for a smuggled migrant to remain for some determined time in exchange for testimony (and with the guarantee of protection if needed).
The last element I would like to mention under this broad heading of remedial action is the amnesty option. It is not always appropriate, and it is almost always controversial. Time doesn't allow for discussion here of all the pros and cons of what some see as a "reward" to lawbreakers and others see as an opportunity to address clandestinity. But I did feel I would be remiss if I did not at least put it on the table as a policy element to be considered.
This rounds out the third segment of this paper, dealing with the policy options to address migrant smuggling. In it, I focused essentially on actions which could be taken by individual States. That reflects a world where immigration is still seen as a quintessential sovereign right of States. But it is worth recalling that this paper began with an emphasis on globalization and increasing interdependence as major factors in a new global migration scenario. That is why, in the fourth and last part of this paper, I would like to turn the spotlight on how greater international dialogue can contribute to both understanding and addressing current migration issues like migrant smuggling.
As we look once again at the arrows on the map referred to earlier, the case for cooperation becomes fairly clear. Everybody is in this together. Successful prevention at one border along the way leaves a smuggled migrant population in front of that barrier. What previously was a transit country can thus quickly become a destination by default - and may even be a relatively attractive one, even if it was not the original destination, as we have seen from the Central European situation. And even if the transit country remains just that - a transit country - it is suddenly confronted with a transient population that it is often ill prepared to deal with. Moreover, whether at the source, en route or at the final border crossing, organized crime has a considerable stake in delivering its "goods." It can and does use the significant resources at its disposal to undermine the integrity of borders, civil servants and communities, all along the migration chain.
For reasons such as these, multi-national operations like migrant smuggling are unlikely to be countered successfully by a string of unilateral, disparate national measures.
Recognition of the benefits of multilateral dialogue and cooperation for collectively understanding and addressing migration has grown considerably since the International Conference on Population and Development was held in Cairo in 1994. Many thought that the next logical step after Cairo would be an international conference on migration. However, that idea has not gained a critical mass of supporters - or a clarity of objectives - such as to be on the immediate horizon. On the other hand, regional and sub-regional consultation processes have indeed blossomed since then in the Americas, Asia and Europe, and are starting to develop in Africa as well. One of the prime examples exists in this region: it is the five year old Puebla Process, comprising all of Central and North America.
One of the most interesting characteristics of all these consultation processes is that they have developed into regular, constructive opportunities for a migration dialogue among countries of origin, transit and destination - that is to say, groups of countries with obviously differing perspectives on many migration issues. Migrant smuggling and trafficking are consistently among the major items on their agendas. And the similarities in the paths of their dialogue have been striking. Beginning with identifying the desirability of strengthening and harmonizing national legislation, a consensus has developed on the need to share information - among police authorities of course, but also among migration officials and diplomats. The Puebla group has gone so far as to create a virtual secretariat to facilitate electronic communication amongst participants. Workshops and training sessions on specific topics- such as document fraud or respect for migrants rights - have also been concrete outcomes. A stronger capacity to deal with smuggling nationally and regionally - including a network of personal contacts to facilitate cooperation across borders - has been a major product of the more advanced consultations. That, in fact, has been one of the main factors generating the interest in starting similar dialogues in other regions. And it is not far-fetched to envision linkages among the various regional dialogues allowing them eventually to share information globally on routes and methods, to compare notes on policy successes and failures, and to discuss "lessons learned" on operational issues in the fight against human smuggling - just as they are now starting to do on a more limited, regional basis.
It is obvious that there is no silver bullet for dealing with migrant smuggling. There is no easy, simple policy response to a phenomenon of this complexity, bringing together as it does potential for great profit, clever professional criminals, human aspirations for personal betterment, legitimate concern for law and order and controllable borders, and humanitarian obligations. But I would like to close with two points I hope all can agree on. First, that multi-dimensional and collective responses to human smuggling have the best shot at success. And second, that even when the smuggled are misguided, they are human beings. While what they have done must be dealt with firmly, they can still be dealt with fairly and humanely - as one human being to another.
