Does minorities
politics matter? Ethnic civic communities and immigrant policies in Liege and
Zurich
Paper presented at the sixth international Metropolis conference,
Rotterdam, the Netherlands
November 26-30 2001
WORK IN PROGRESS NOT
TO BE CITED
Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
University of Amsterdam
Fennema@pscw.uva.nl
Tillie@pscw.uva.nl
1. Introduction.
In more and more European cities the political participation of
immigrant groups becomes an important policy topic. In cities like Athens,
Barcelona, Birmingham, Brussels, Marseille, Lisbon and Paris more and more
attention is paid to the incorporation of ethnic minorities in decision making
processes [Rogers, 2001 #301]. In various cities this has resulted in the
establishment of a consultative structure between the municipal government and
the immigrant population in order to reveal political preferences of ethnic
minorities [Anderson, 1990 #330]. In some countries, like Ireland, Sweden,
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, immigrants were explicitly granted local
voting rights.
Sometimes the focus on ethnic minority participation is the
(unintended) result of specific political issues in the concerning city. For
example, in Oeiras (Lisbon) the official position of the Town Hall has been not
to recognize any form of collective body claiming to represent immigrants' and
ethnic minorities' interest. However, the core of the Oeiras URBAN re-housing
program (the local implementation of the European URBAN program) is the idea of
partnership between public institutions and local actors representing (ethnic)
communities' interest [Marques, 2001 #331].
The same phenomenon can be observed in a city like Marseilles. As a result of
urban regeneration policies in the northern areas of Marseilles, a group of
'mediators' emerged between the North African minority and public institutions.
These mediators gradually pushed the local authorities into creating formal and
informal political and institutional opportunity structures for the North
African minority and for other ethnic minorities in Marseilles [Moore, 2001
#333].
Political participation of immigrant groups is thus a key value in
multicultural policies in various European cities. However, it can also be
considered a key value of multicultural democracy.
Multicultural democracy can be defined as a democracy where ethnic minorities
participate in the democratic process, thus providing the political elite with
reliable information about the political preferences of these minorities and
the democratic institutions with popular legitimacy among the minority groups
[Fennema, 2001 #334]. The more ethnic groups participate in decision-making
processes the higher the quality of multicultural democracy. Variables that
explain the political participation of ethnic groups thus explain variation in
the quality of multicultural democracy.
Previous research has demonstrated that an important predictor of
the political participation of ethnic groups is the degree of (ethnic) civic community [Fennema and Tillie,
1999 #108] [Fennema and Tillie, 2001 #200]. The greater the degrees of civic
community within an ethnic group, the more individual members of this group
politically participate. The concept of civic community refers to voluntary
associations of free citizens that are set up to pursue a common goal or a
common interest. These associations are supposed to generate social trust.
Trust is defined here as good will among members of an association which leads
to risk taking in the decision to engage in interaction with other members of
that association (compare [Coleman, 1990 #259, 91 ff]). The social
participation in ethnic voluntary associations is crucial for democracy for at
least three reasons. In the first place it is its voluntary character. As an alternative to loyalty, members of
voluntary organizations always have the option of exit and that gives their
voice a natural strength. Since each member can withdraw from it, the free will
of the associates is the bottom line of the organization. Their support can
never be taken for granted; the potential members must be 'seduced' to join.
Voluntary social participation can be considered a 'learning school' for
political participation in a democratic society. It is the participation of
free and independent individuals, which join in a collective effort (that is,
the activities of the ethnic organization). Forced cooperation can do the same
trick, as is shown in aristocratic societies. But in such societies citizens
are not free and independent. An elected government can also enforce
cooperation for a common goal, but that would easily lead to democratic
despotism. In both cases - in aristocratic societies and in centralized
state-oriented democracies - vertical relations predominate, whereas in a
society made of voluntary associations horizontal relations predominate.
This brings us to the second aspect of voluntary associations that
has a political socialization effect upon the members: the importance of horizontal relations. Voluntary associations
somehow have to treat their members as free and autonomous subjects and allow
for horizontal relations. Horizontal relations make that members of an
association not only have the option of exit, but also that of voice. Through
horizontal organization members can monitor their boards - even if these boards
are not democratically elected. Disapproval of the leadership's policies can be
aired and leadership is held accountable to the rank and file.
The third element of voluntary associations that accounts for its
political mobilization potential is trust.
Trust is needed to solve the collective action dilemma inherent in any
purposive group. In all instances it is created and maintained because the
members have mechanisms to monitor each other. Memberships of voluntary
associations develop capacities that citizens need to do something about bad
governance by engaging in a process of political mobilization. Thus, voluntary
associations are a hotbed of civic engagement and social trust. Trust that has been
built up in one voluntary association spills over to other organizations and to
the public space. Members of voluntary associations are more readily to
collaborate in a common endeavor that is not part of the mission of the
association. Furthermore, members of voluntary associations are more
self-confident in politics and trust the government. There are two reasons for
this. The first is that trust is related to civility and becomes a generalized
attitude that is not restricted to the association where it originally
developed. This reason stresses the cultural aspect of civil society. It is
based on the assumption that the norms and values of a voluntary association
have a civic core that has wider implications than the group in which such
norms and values are embedded. Voluntary associations create civic virtues
among its members and these virtues are transferred to a wider circle of
associational activities that make up civil society. The second,
institutionalist reason is that in a civic community voluntary associations
communicate amongst each other through informal contacts and because their
memberships and boards overlap. Here the structural side of civil society is
emphasized. Interlocking directorates among (ethnic) voluntary associations
play a crucial role in the formation of civil society because they create
permanent communication channels between different organizations. We would
therefore expect a strong civic community to have many voluntary associations
that are horizontally connected through interlocking directorates. Even though
these horizontal relations in the form of interlocking board membership exist
only at the elite level, they form a crucial element in the formation of civic
communities. It is precisely this relationship between ethnic associations, the
density of the network of interlocking directorates and the level of political
participation and political trust of ethnic groups that we demonstrated in
earlier research. The stronger the ethnic civic community, the more members of this
community politically participate and the more they trust the democratic
institutions [Fennema and Tillie, 1999 #108].
The importance of ethnic civic community to multicultural democracy
emphasizes the need for a study of variables that explain ethnic organization
formation. As early as in 1964 Raymond Breton already noticed (in a different
context) the importance of the study of these variables. He suggests three
possible factors, which relate to the 'formation of a public for ethnic
organizations' [Breton, 1964 #335, p. 204-205]:
·
The ethnic group may possess some
differentiating social or cultural attribute (like language, color or religion)
which can set it apart from the native community;
·
The level of resources among the
members of an ethnic group (low levels of resources provide an important
"clientele" to support welfare and mutual benefit organizations) and, finally,
·
Patterns of migration and settlement
(like the number of immigrants of a given ethnicity and the rate at which they
arrive).
To this we would like to add (see also, [Vermeulen, 2001 #338]):
transnational (political) influence and the political opportunity structure
within the receiving society.
Transnational influence refers to transnational institutional interventions from the home country
into local ethnic communities. One can think of for example subsidizing
churches or establishing representative organizations by the state of origin or
political parties or labor unions in the land of origin. The Political Opportunity Structure concept
(POS) refers to 'consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national
- dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage
people from using collective action' [Tarrow, 1994 #340, p.18]. The political
opportunity structure is conceptualized by four components: national (and
local) cleavage structures; institutional structures; prevailing strategies and
alliance structures.
The first element refers to the way in which social and cultural
cleavages have historically shaped political cleavage structures that, in turn,
shape the social movements' opportunities. The second element refers to the
formal institutional and legal settings of a certain polity. The third element
(that of prevailing strategies) relates to the structure of the policy that is
not covered by the second element. This element accounts for the informal
procedures and operating practices. The fourth and final aspect of political
structure, alliance structures or the configuration of power, refers to short
term "windows of opportunities" that can open up or close down. For example,
due to the opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments,
the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among the
elite.
In this paper we study the
effect of the institutional structures on ethnic organization formation. That
is, to what degree do formal
institutional and legal settings determine the number, activities and networks
of ethnic organizations? We do this by studying local immigrant policies
and activities and networks of ethnic organizations in two European cities: Liege and Zurich (later we will add data from Amsterdam to this analysis). Our study contains the following
steps: section 2 describes some basic data on Liege and Zurich. In section 3 we
study the institutional opportunities for immigrant communities in each city.
Section 4 describes the activities and networks of ethnic organizations in each
city and compares the results for Liege and Zurich. Using this comparison we
will present in section 5 some hypotheses on the relation between local
institutional opportunity structures and networks of ethnic organizations.
2. Liege and Zurich: basic data.
To get a first impression of
the cities we discuss in this paper, we present here some basic characteristics
of Liege and Zurich during the time of our fieldwork (September-December 1998).
These characteristics include city size, cycles of migration for the city and
the (resulting) composition of immigrant/ethnic minority populations. Most of
this material is taken from the so-called "city templates" that were written as
contributions to the UNESCO-MOST project Multicultural Policies and Modes of
Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC-project) [Martiniello, 1998 #347] [Mahnig,
1998 #348]. For more information on the MPMC-project refer to http://www.unesco.org/most/p97.htm and Rogers and
Tillie (2001).
2.1 Liege.
Size
Belgium consists of 30.519 km2 of which 44.3% encompasses
the Flanders region, 55.2% the Walloon region and 0.5% the Brussels region.
There are 10 provinces in Belgium of which the province of Liege is one. The
province of Liege (3.876 km2) is divided in 4 arrondisements (Huy, Liege, Verviers, Waremme) and 94 communes (municipalities). Huy includes
17 municipalities, Verviers 29, Waremme 14 and Liege 24. In 1998, there were
1.016.762 inhabitants in the province of Liege of which 901.894 (88.7%)
possessed the Belgium nationality and 114.868 (11.3%) were foreigners. The
municipality of Liege consists of 3.876 km2 and 188.390 inhabitants
[Martiniello, 1998 #347].
Cycles
of migration for the city
Liege has a long history of dependence on immigration. This is due
to the presence of a heavy coal industry in the Walloon region. The first
migrants at the end of the 19th century were Flemish workers, recruited for
work in the mines and, later, in the metallurgical sector. At the beginning of
the 20th century, the district of Liege counted approximately 30.000
foreigners. This figure fell to 11.000 as a result of the First World War.
Immigrants came from Russia, Poland and Italy. These people were not treated as
refugees but like common workers. In the thirties, the foreign population of
the Liege increases to approximately 35.000 people. After the Second World War,
the pressing need for workers coupled with the refusal of the Belgians who
refuse to work in the coal-mines (heavy, arduous and dangerous work) induced
the Belgian authorities and industrial circles to recruit foreign workers.
Initially German prisoners were chosen for the task thus joining the Italian,
Polish and German workers already on the spot. After that displaced persons
like Hungarians and Poles were called upon. Nevertheless, the number of workers
proved to be insufficient and this mainly explains the first International
Convention signed between Belgium and Italy in 1946. The Italian authorities
ended this bilateral agreement ten years later, following the mine catastrophe
of Marcinelle. The number of
immigrants in the district of Liege increased from 53.935 in 1947 to 103.953 in
1965. In same time, the Belgian population of the kingdom went up from
8.144.576 people to 8.875.340, an increase of 8.9 %. In less than twenty years,
the foreign population of the district of Liege thus increased by 50.118
people, which implies that immigration figures practically doubled in less than
twenty years. In 1965, the foreign population represented 16,5 % of the total
population, whereas at the same time, this percentage was 11,2 % for the
province of Liege and 6,5 % for Belgium. From 1965, migration flows changed,
especially after 1973-1974, when the policy of fixed quotas of immigrants
officially came to an end. Since the 80's, new categories of refugees but also
students arrive in Liege. In 1980, the town of Liege counted 216.604
inhabitants including 173.726 Belgians (78.166 men and 95.560 women, 80,2 % of
the total population) and 42.878 foreigners (23.906 men and 18.972 women, 19,8
% of the total population). Nowadays, there is a huge ethnic variation in the
foreign population of Liege, although several dominant groups can be
distinguished.
Composition
of immigrant/ethnic minority populations
In 1998 the town of Liege consisted of a total of 188.390
inhabitants of which 33.212 were foreigners (17,6 %) and 155.178 Belgians (82,4
%) [Martiniello, 1998 #347, p. 3]. Of the foreigners 62% came from Member
States of the European Union and 38% of countries outside the European Union.
Of the foreigners 82 % originated from 6 countries only, the remaining 18%
consisting of some fifty different nationalities; each one of them occupying 1%
of the population at a maximum. The six most important ethnic groups are
depicted in table 1.
Table 1 - Most important ethnic groups in Liege
|
|
|
1988 (% of total foreign
population)
|
|
Italians
|
40%
|
|
Moroccans
|
15
|
|
Spaniards
|
9
|
|
Turks
|
8
|
|
French
|
7
|
|
Congolese (Kinshasa)
|
3
|
|
Other
|
18
|
|
SOURCE: [Martiniello, 1998 #347, p. 6]
|
2.2
Zurich.
Size
The city of Zurich is a municipality of 92 km2 and as
such the largest of the 261 communes of the canton of Zurich (1728 km2).
The city is divided in 12 boroughs (Kreise)
- with a surface ranging from 1,8 km2 (Kreis
1) to 15 km2 (Kreis 7) - and 34
neighborhoods (Quartiere). In 1997,
335.943 persons were living in Zurich. The whole metropolitan area of Zurich is
far larger than the municipality alone and stretches over the limits of the
canton. In 1996 the agglomeration of Zurich defined as an area consisting of
100 municipalities - 84 from the canton of Zurich, 15 from the canton of Aargau
and one from the canton of Schwyz - included 948.537 persons [Mahnig, 1998
#348, p. 2].
Cycles of migration for the city
Immigration to Zurich has a long history and reflects more or less
the migration pattern on the national level. The first waves at the end of the
19th and the beginning of the 20th century were mainly of
French, Italian and German origin. The big parts of the immigrants were workers
employed in construction and textile manufactories. In 1900 the part of the
foreigners on the total population of Zurich was 28.8%; it increased to a
highpoint of 33.4% in 1910. The most of the Italians lived in this time in Aussersihl, a neighborhood which, in
1896, became the place of a violent outburst of anger and xenophobic
resentments of the autochthonous against them, the so-called "Italian
riots" (Italienerkrawalle).
The number of migrants decreased rapidly during World War I and
World War II. Many of the migrants returned to their countries of origin and
their part on the total population felt to 21.2% in 1920, 17.1% in 1930 and 8.5%
in 1940. The lowest number and also the lowest percentage of foreigners in
Zurich during this century were registered in 1945: 24.306 or 6.8%. However not
all of the migrants left the country during this period: some of them had
acquired Swiss citizenship and remained. These first generations of immigrants
have today completely assimilated and are no longer distinguishable as
immigrant communities.
The next cycle of immigration in
Zurich followed also closely the pattern on the national level. After the already
mentioned minimum in 1945, the numbers of migrants rose steadily until 1960,
between 1950 and 1960 even in a very rapid way. The large part of them came
from Italy and Spain and responded to the demand for unqualified workers in the
sector of construction and in restaurants and hotels [Mahnig, 1998 #348, pp.
9-10].
Between 1960 and 1985 the increase of the number of migrants slowed
down and was between 1975 and 1980 even negative, reflecting the logic of the
developments on the national level.
Since the beginning of the 1980s there is a new increase of the
number of migrants from 67.000 in 1980 to 101.000 in 1995 and in the same time
their part on the total population grew from 18.1% to 28.1%. However, the
mounting part of foreigners on the total population of Zurich since World War
II can only partly be explained by the increase of their number, which rose
between 1950 and 1995 by 69.766 persons. Another important reason is the
out-migration of Swiss population from the city to the suburbs, which results
in a decrease of their number by 98.513 persons during the same period. The
reason that since 1980 the percentage of foreigners is increasing faster in
Zurich than on the national level (which is also true for other Swiss cities)
is thus the social polarization between the big urban centers and the rest of
the country [Mahnig, 1998 #348, p. 10].
Composition
of immigrant/ethnic minority populations
The Swiss statistics on the national level only distinguish
foreigners and nationals. The same is true for the city of Zurich. There is no
registration of ethnic origin. However, because the law on citizenship is very
restrictive compared to other European countries, looking at the number of
foreigners gives quite a good picture of the amount of migrants living in the
city.
|
Table
2 - Composition of foreign residents in Zurich by country of origin and
percentage of the total foreign population (1996)
|
|
|
Number
|
% of total foreign population
|
|
Italy
|
19.413
|
19,0
|
|
Republic of Yugoslavia*
|
16.172
|
15,8
|
|
Germany
|
9.806
|
9,6
|
|
Spain
|
8.026
|
7,9
|
|
Portugal
|
6.048
|
5,9
|
|
Turkey
|
5.825
|
5,7
|
|
Sri Lanka
|
3.905
|
3,8
|
|
Croatia
|
3.528
|
3,5
|
|
Austria
|
2.883
|
2,8
|
|
Macedonia
|
2.702
|
2,6
|
|
Bosnia
|
2.148
|
2,1
|
|
Greece
|
1.844
|
1,8
|
|
UK
|
1.222
|
1,2
|
|
USA
|
1.117
|
1,1
|
|
Other countries
|
17.409
|
17,2
|
|
Total of foreigners
|
102.048
|
100
|
|
SOURCE:
[Mahnig, 1998 #348, p. 11]
|
3.
'Institutional opportunity structures' in Liege and Zurich.
3.1
Comparing institutional structures in European cities.
How can we compare institutional structures in European cities that
allows for an international comparison between cities but also allows for
assessing the influence of these structures on the activities and networks of
ethnic organizations? One way to approach it would be to classify the policies
in one way or another and compare these general classifications to the
activities and networks of ethnic organizations. For example, after reviewing
multicultural policies in ten European cities, Rogers, Tillie and Vertovec
conclude that two criteria can be used to classify the institutional characteristics
of these policies:
·
Can the
policies which are developed, be characterized as group specific, i.e. directed specifically towards ethnic
minorities, for example, supporting ethnic association activities) or general (issue-based), i.e. directed to
people in need irrespective of their ethnic background? For example, is some
kind of consultative structure between the city and the immigrant population
established?
·
Are
(local) voting rights granted to ethnic minorities in so far as they are
non-citizens? (Rogers, Tillie and Vertovec, 2001, p. ***)
These criteria
can certainly be used as a general tool for classifying local policies.
However, for our purposes they seem somewhat to general. Studying the
influence of institutional structures on networks of ethnic organizations
requires a more detailed focus on the policies (and the networks). Just
classifying policies as 'general' or 'group-specific' would ignore the
nuances in these policies and the direct influence these nuances (can)
have on specific, detailed characteristics of the networks we study. For
example, just stating that a policy can be classified as 'general' can
mean a lot of things for ethnic networks. They can seek alliances with
unions or churches, they can seek no alliances at all, they can organize
solely on 'cultural' identities, they can combine an ethnic identity with
a (working) class focus etc. This illustrates that the label 'general
policies' is too general to allow for specific hypotheses about influences
of these policies on ethnic networks.
Therefore, we
here use a somewhat different approach to local policies, in order to
address their possible influence on the activities and networks of ethnic
organizations. Below, we will classify migrant policies in Liege and
Zurich in terms of the explicit goals these policies formulate. That is,
if the objectives are, for example, stimulating the participation of
ethnic organizations in decision-making policies, we expect, if policies
influence ethnic civic community, links between policy-making institutions
(policy departments) and ethnic organizations. If policies are directed to
everyone in need, and policies do affect ethnic networks, we expect
linkages between ethnic organizations and other organizations, which
represent 'people in need' (for example, the unemployed). This line of
reasoning thus requires a classification of local policies in terms of
implicit or explicit policy objectives. In order to address the
influence of immigrant policies on ethnic civic community, we deduce from
these policy objectives expected interventions in ethnic networks. After
that we will empirically assess whether these interventions can be
observed and whether ethnic policies can be said to influence ethnic
networks. The same goes for the granting of local voting rights. The
question is do voting rights (or the lack thereof) have a direct influence
on ethnic networks. It seems that as well as policies as voting rights can
effect ethnic civic community. Voting rights may determine the activities
and networks of ethnic organizations (that is, employing political
activities, establishing ethnic political parties or seeking alliances
with existing political parties). However, the lack of voting rights can
also influence ethnic networks, especially if 'the right to vote' becomes
a political issue. Ethnic organizations can focus their activities to this
political struggle or can seek alliances with actors that support the
granting of voting rights (political parties, support organizations). Thus
we can include the (non-) existence of voting rights in our classification
of local immigrant policies and study their effects upon ethnic civic
community.
Below we will
discuss immigrant policies in Liege and Zurich. Each section will
summarize the policies in terms of its policy objectives and the expected
effects on ethnic networks. These policy objectives and expected effects
are then used to study their (potential) influence on the activities and
networks of ethnic organizations.
3.2 Political
structures in Liege.
Local policies with respect to migrants in Liege
cannot be understood without a reference to the various governmental
levels in Belgium. We will focus here on relevant developments in the
nineties of the previous century when policies with respect to immigrants
were made more explicit. We distinguish between the national, community,
regional, provincial and communal level. In 1991 the national
government established, reacting upon large-scale ethnic minority youth
riots in Brussels and surroundings, the Fonds d'Impulsion
à la Politique de Immigrés (FIPI). The fund was established to finance
immigrant participation projects. In the Walloon region the labor office
FOREM
decides upon FIPI-grants. In 1992 the Conseil
Consultatif de la Main d'Oeuvre Etrangere (CCMOE) replaced the Conseil
Consultatif de l'Immigration (CCI). The CCMOE has as its main goal the
creation of conditions, which enable the integration of immigrants and
their families'. It consists of representatives of unions and public
authorities and national ministries. In 1993 Centre Pour
Egalité des Chances et la Lutte contre Racisme' were established.
These centers build upon research of the preceding Commissariat
Royal à la Politique de Immigrés in the areas of employment, housing,
education, youth work and health care. The centers serve public
authorities and civic organizations. Furthermore their task is a
'continuous struggle' against racism and xenophobia.
At the community level the national government
established in 1987 an advisory council for the French region: Conseil
Consultatif pour les Populations d'origine Etrangère de la Communauté
Française. This council consists of representatives of public
authorities, trade unions and employers' organizations, immigrant
organizations and Belgian support organizations, which focus upon
immigrants. Its practice is built around a concept of integration, which
includes two dimensions: a cultural dimension and an socio-economic
dimension. With regard to the first, initiatives include so-called
'intercultural meetings'. With regard to the socio-economic dimension,
French language courses are developed and actions to fight racism and
discrimination are undertaken.
In 1996 the Walloon region
decided to establish six regional 'integration centers', one of which in
Liege. On the board of these centers are representatives of public
authorities, Belgian support and immigrant organizations. The centers aim
at formulating a coherent integration policy. More specifically:
·
To develop activities that promotes the integration
process, preferably by agreements between organizations and local
authorities in the areas of housing and health care;
·
Improving education services to ethnic
minorities;
·
Collecting statistical data on immigration and
integration;
·
Evaluation of local integration initiatives;
·
Stimulating the participation of ethnic minorities in
the cultural, social and economic domain;
·
Stimulating intercultural interactions guaranteeing
respect for cultural differences.
From 1964, at the provincial
level, there exist the so-called Service Proviciaux d'Immigration et d'Accueil
(SPIA). Purpose of these services is to encourage immigrants to
integrate in the local community. The SPIA of Liege gathers trade unions,
immigrant sporting and cultural organizations as well as political
organizations. The service is integrated into the provincial
administration.
From 1968 there exist at the communal
level local Conseils Consultatif Communaux des Immigrés
(CCCI). These are advisory councils created as institutional mechanisms
for the participation of immigrant communities in decision-making
processes. Some observers, however, believe that they have no real
political influence (Martiniello and Kagné, p. ***). After the 1994
elections, the alderman of housing, sports and youth became also
responsible for so-called 'intercultural relations' in Liege. The
department of intercultural relations was established to improve relations
between citizens of Liege (whatever their nationality). The department is
also responsible for the development of neighborhood services for people
in an arrears position.
In Belgium non-EU residents have no (local) voting
rights. However, the right to vote is politicized. Much of the national
and local debates with respect to multicultural society focus on the
question whether voting rights should be granted to non-EU immigrants.
Before we
discuss the expected influence of various policy initiatives on ethnic
networks, is it important to notice that policies do not only create links
between governmental (or other) agencies and ethnic organizations, but
also establish
new internal networks between ethnic organizations. For example, an
advisory council creates not only links between the local government and
ethnic organizations but also new links between these organizations
themselves. We want to emphasize this because it are these kind of
internal links which serve as bridges between separate clusters of the
ethnic community (see Fennema and Tillie, 1999, pp. ***). Organizations
with different political or religious orientations that ordinarily would
not meet are horizontally linked to each other. In this way, the policy
initiative contributes significantly to the degree of ethnic civic
community by creating internal linkages between ethnic organizations.
Figure 1 illustrates this point further. The advisory council creates
external linkages between the local government and ethnic organizations,
but also links religious and non-religious organizations and right wing
and left-wing organizations. By this it increases the degree of horizontal
linkages within the ethnic community.
|
Figure 1
- Policy initiative creating internal and external linkages between
ethnic organizations
|
|
    
Political Right Ethnic organization
| |
Political Left Ethnic Organization
| |
Non-religious Ethnic Organization
| |
Religious Ethnic Organization
| |
|
It is also important to notice that not each link
resulting from government interventions can be interpreted as a horizontal
one. Government policy can also create vertical
linkages between local authorities and ethnic organizations. For example,
in the case of ethnic organizations being dependent upon government
grants.
Table 3 summarizes the various policy objectives in
Liege and their expected effects on ethnic civic community.
Table 3 -
Belgian immigrant policy objectives and expected influence on ethnic
civic community |
Policy objective |
Expected influence on ethnic
networks. Links between: |
National level |
|
|
CCMOE:
enable the integration of immigrants and their
families |
Trade
unions; national government and ethnic
organizations. |
|
Centre Pour Egalité des Chances et la Lutte
contre Racisme': integration in the areas of employment, housing,
education, youth work and health care. Fighting racism.
|
Governmental institutions and ethnic
organizations; ethnic organizations and other civic
organizations |
Community level |
|
|
|
|
Walloon region |
|
|
Integration centers: formulating coherent
integration policies |
Public
authorities, Belgian support organizations and ethnic
organizations. |
Provincial level |
|
|
SPIA:
encourage immigrants to integrate in the local
community |
Trade
unions, ethnic organizations and political
organizations. |
Communal level |
|
|
|
Local
authorities and ethnic organizations. |
|
Immigrant
voting rights political issue |
Ethnic
organizations, Belgian support organizations and sympathetic
political actors (political parties,
NGO's). |
We choose a rather straightforward way to deduce the
expected interventions of Liege immigrant policies in ethnic networks: we
identify the main actors of the policies and assume that linkages will be
established between these actors and ethnic organizations. For example, in
the case of the Conseil Consultatif pour les Populations d'origine
Etrangère de la Communauté Française which consists of representatives of public authorities,
trade unions and employers' organizations, immigrant organizations and
Belgian support organizations, we assume that linkages between these
actors will be established. This reasoning results in the expected
interventions as described in the right column of table 3. With respect to
immigrant
voting rights we assume linkages between actors, which mobilize on
this issue. In this case, ethnic organizations, immigrants support
organizations and political actors sympathetic to the issue of immigrant
voting rights. This may also be reflected in the political activities of
an important part of the ethnic organizations.
3.3 Migrant policies
in Zurich.
In Switzerland
we have to distinguish between two governmental levels: the national level
and the local level. At the national level the twenty-three cantons composing
Switzerland have a large autonomy (federalism). Swiss parliament is
divided in two chambers, the Nationalrat (representatives of the people) and the
Ständerat
(representatives of the cantons). In order to pass parliament, a law has
to be voted by a majority in each chamber. At the local (Zurich) level we
have the Gemeinderat (municipal council) and executive (Stadtrat).
With respect to the national level Mahnig concludes: "one can say, that in
Switzerland it is today hardly possible to speak of a real integration
policy for migrants on the federal level. Integration structures can
primarily be found on the level of non-official organizations
(associations, labor-unions etc.) as well as on the level of local
administration (cantons and municipalities). That is the reason why some
scholars speak of the " integrationist federalism " in
Switzerland. The vote for an integration article (in the Aliens law of
1931, which gives the confederation the possibility to subsidize local
integration projects, MF/JT) - although a very modest measure - can be
interpreted as a first step towards a different policy" (Mahnig and
Wimmer, 1998, p. ***)
This brings us
to the local (Zurich) level. For a long time there has
been no clear policy towards migrants in Zurich. In 1968 the
" Municipal Commission for the assimilation question " (Städtische
Kommission für Assimilierungsfragen) was set up which changed its name
later to "Municipal Commission for the questions of foreigners" (Städtische
Kommission für Ausländerfragen). This commission represents political
parties, employer organizations, labor unions, churches, and immigrant
associations. The commission, which holds regularly meetings, is charged
to make recommendations to the Gemeinderat and Stadtrat.
In 1969 the
" Co-ordination Office for the Questions of Foreigners " (Koordinationsstelle für Ausländerfragen - KSA)
was set up. It is charged to serve on the one hand as secretariat for the
commission and on the other hand to co-ordinate the action of different
administrative services concerning migrants. In 1988 the number of the
employees was multiplied by five because of the setting up of a
consultation service for migrants. Because the unemployment of migrants
(for the first as well as for the second generation) was until the 1990s
not really an issue on the political agenda, the policy of the KSA can be
characterized as a policy of mediation and information. The KSA has
recently been renamed in " Office for intercultural questions "
(Fachstelle
für Interkulturelle Fragen).
During the same
period different administrative branches developed their own actions in
regard to migrants. This is particularly true in the field of education:
the cantonal authorities took a number of initiatives: in 1980 the
" Direction for Education of the Canton of Zurich " (Erziehungsdirektion des Kantons Zürich) sets up a
special service called " Pedagogy for Foreigners " (Ausländerpädagogik). During the following years,
however the concept of " Pedagogy for Foreigners " is
progressively replaced by the idea of " Intercultural Pedagogy" and
in 1987 the cantonal authorities adopt a comprehensive approach for
intercultural education.
At the
beginning of the 1990s unemployment becomes the key policy issue. Migrants
are particularly suffering from this development because of their strong
representation in the lowest segments of the labor market. Furthermore the
issue of segregation becomes more salient. The high proportion of migrants
in some neighborhoods was politicized and defined as a threat to law and
order by the Conservative party (SVP) that speaks of "ghettos" and
"slums". The local authorities make two attempts to respond to this
harsher climate. In 1993, after the racist murder of a young Tamil, the Gemeinderat
votes a credit of 40.000 Swiss francs and charges the KSA to organize
actions for the better mutual understanding of migrants and Swiss. The KSA
sets up the project " z'Züri dehei? " (At home in
Zurich?), which tries to support different cultural actions on which
migrants and Swiss participate together. The central event of the project
is a week of intercultural meetings in May 1994, involving sixty
associations of migrants and Swiss under the title Piazza
Mondiale.
Another
attempts for a better integration of the migrants living in Zurich has
been a failure: in January 1996 the municipal parliament (Gemeinderat)
decides to ease some of the criteria for naturalization of foreigners.
Because of the still restrictive rules the Green party and the
Alternatives voted against the changes, which all the big parties
supported. The members of the extreme right party Swiss
Democrats (Schweizer Demokraten) voted also against the
changes and after their adoption launched a referendum, which succeeded in
stopping the easing of naturalization criteria. In the following years the
political climate concerning migrants in Zurich gets harsher because the
Conservative party (SVP) tries to win votes by making migrants responsible
for general social problems of the city. The party continues the
politicization of the migrant issue, using the referendum. In spring 1998
the Gemeinderat decides to subsidize a "contact
network" for migrants from Kosovo with 50.000 SFr. The SVP launches the
referendum against this decision, which is considered by the other parties
as a reasonable project concerning an excluded group. In the popular vote
of June, the 7th
1998, 56% of the voters follow the SVP and reject the project.
One month
before this event, in May 1998, the Mayor of Zurich presented a Design for
integration (Integrationsleitbild) that is the result of a
study made by the Institute of Ethnology of the University of Zurich and
aims at a new comprehensive approach for an integration policy in Zurich.
The Leitbild considers the exclusion of an increasing
number of migrants from the labor market as the central problem of the
city and demands a policy facing this issue by programs of education and
vocational training. It considers also that housing segregation and the
concentration of migrants in certain neighborhoods will become a serious
topic and asks for the implementation of a dispersal policy. The authors
analyze the concentration of social problems in Zurich as the outcome of
the federal admission policy, which, according to them, allowed for a long
time the immigration of unqualified foreign workers in the interest of
certain economic branches. Therefore they demand a more restrictive
admission policy in the future. During the summer of 1998, the Leitbild
leads to a large and controversial debate. Faced with these critical
reactions, the Mayor of Zurich decided in November 1998 to rewrite the Integrationsleitbild and to include also members
of migrant organizations in the new working group.
Table 4
summarizes the (few) Zurich immigrant policy initiatives.
Table 4 - Zurich immigrant policy
objectives and expected influence on ethnic civic
community |
Policy objective |
Expected influence on ethnic
networks. Links between: |
Federal level |
|
|
No
integration policy. Integration structures on the level of
non-official organizations |
None |
Local (Zurich) level |
|
|
|
Political
parties, employer organizations, labor unions, churches, and
immigrant associations. |
|
KSA:
'intercultural' initiatives |
Ethnic
organizations and Zurich civic
organizations |
The Zurich case
might be a case study for what happens to ethnic civic community if no policies
are developed or if there exist a repressive political climate towards
immigrants. On the federal level no integration policy is developed and on
the Zurich level only a few initiatives exist. These initiatives might
therefore have only a very weak influence on ethnic civic community.
However, if they have an influence we expect it to be as
summarized in table 4. The Städtische Kommission für Ausländerfragen will
result in linkages between the actors that are represented in the
commission (political parties, employer's organizations etc.). The KSA projects
will result in linkages between ethnic organizations and Zurich civic
organizations.
The almost
non-existence of immigrant policy in Zurich makes it from an international
comparative perspective an interesting case. What happens in a city if the
dynamics of ethnic organization formation are not influenced by policy
interventions? Which activities do ethnic organizations employ? What kind
of linkages is established?
4. Ethnic civic communities in Liege and
Zurich.
The sections
below are schematic and will be elaborated.
We present here
briefly our research strategy and the first preliminary conclusions that
can be drawn from our first analyses of the Liege and Zurich
data.
We will use the
following criteria to compare ethnic civic communities in Liege and
Zurich:
·
Activities
of ethnic organizations
·
Activities
of Italian
organizations in Liege and Zurich
·
Density of
Italian
organizations in Liege and Zurich
·
Key
organizations in networks of ethnic organizations in Liege and
Zurich
In a later
version of the paper we will add the density of the
network of ethnic organizations.
4.1 Activities
of ethnic organizations.
The first
question we address is whether we can find a difference in activities of
ethnic organizations in Liege and Zurich. This includes the activities of
all organizations that focus on ethnic groups in the city (including
'native' multicultural organizations).
Table 5
presents the results for Liege and Zurich.
Table 5 - Activities of ethnic
organizations in Liege and Zurich |
|
|
Liege |
Zurich |
|
Religious |
7% |
13 |
|
Cultural |
14 |
11 |
|
Political |
15 |
6 |
|
Health
and Human services |
10 |
11 |
|
Children/youth targeted services |
7 |
7 |
|
Sports
and recreational facilities |
8 |
5 |
|
Professional (incl. Workers, unemployed,
students) |
11 |
8 |
|
Educational/schooling services |
12 |
10 |
|
Neighborhood oriented |
2 |
- |
|
Women |
5 |
16 |
|
Media |
1 |
1 |
|
General
(various activities) |
8 |
13 |
Unknown
|
1 |
- |
N (100%) |
369
|
155
|
From this table
we observe that:
·
Liege has
more political organizations (which can be the result of the struggle for
voting rights)
·
Zurich has
more religious organizations
·
Zurich has
more women organizations
·
Zurich has
more general organizations
However, to
study the precise influence of immigrant policies on ethnic networks it is
better to compare the activities of organizations within one ethnic
community in both cities (keeping ethnicity constant). As well as in Liege
as in Zurich Italians are the largest groups of immigrants.
Therefore we compare in table 6 the activities of Italian organizations in
Liege and Zurich. Furthermore we report the number of Italian
organizations found compared to the size of the Italian ethnic group in
both cities.
Table 6 - Activities of Italian
organizations in Liege and Zurich |
|
|
Liege |
Zurich |
|
Religious |
3% |
- |
|
Cultural |
24 |
- |
|
Political |
16 |
27 |
|
Health
and Human services |
11 |
18 |
|
Children/youth targeted services |
3 |
- |
|
Sports
and recreational facilities |
11 |
- |
|
Professional (incl. Workers, unemployed,
students) |
8 |
36 |
|
Educational/schooling services |
8 |
18 |
|
Neighborhood oriented |
- |
- |
|
Women |
3 |
- |
|
Media |
3 |
- |
|
General
(various activities) |
11 |
- |
Unknown
|
- |
- |
N (100%) |
37
|
11
|
Number of
Italian organizations divided by number of Italians in city
|
|
|
From this table
we can observe that:
·
The range of
activities of Italian organizations in Liege is larger.
·
Important
organizations for the Italian community in Zurich are professional
organizations, followed by political organizations and (compared to Liege)
educational and schooling organizations.
·
The density
of Italian organizations in Liege is higher than the density of Italian
organizations in Zurich.
4.2 Network of ethnic organizations
If we study the network of ethnic organizations in
Liege and Zurich (resulting from interlocking directorates between
organizations) the following can be observed:
·
In Liege local governmental organizations have a key
position in the network of ethnic organizations (compared to Zurich)
·
In Zurich only one local governmental initiative has
a somewhat comparable position
·
In Zurich key positions in the network are occupied
by religious and women organizations
5. Some hypotheses on the relation between immigrant
policies and ethnic civic community.
From the observations in section 4 we deduce the
following hypotheses concerning the relation between institutional
opportunity structure and activities and networks of ethnic
organizations:
·
Density of Italian organizations in Liege higher than
in Zurich: ethnic minority policies will result in relatively
more ethnic organizations.
·
Liege has more political organizations: important local
immigrant issues are reflected in the activities of ethnic
organizations.
·
Zurich has more religious, women and general
organizations: lack of ethnic minority policies will result in
ethnic organizations expressing 'alternative identity' activities (like
religious or professional activities or activities directed towards
women).
·
The range of activities of Italian organizations in
Liege is larger than in Zurich: group policies will result in ethnic communities
which are more 'institutional complete' (Breton, 1964).
Literature
To be completed.
