Islam in a Multicultural Society: Perspectives of Rotterdam Youngsters

Han Entzinger (Ercomer, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Many young Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam identify strongly with Islam even if they have been in the Netherlands for quite a long time. However, they interpret Islam differently to the "Islam of the fathers", especially if highly educated. Their Islam is individualistic and pluralistic, allowing room for a personal and selective experience of their faith, in which there is room for internal debate and tolerance towards other ways of thinking. In short: an Islam "made in the Netherlands".

This is one of the main conclusions of the report Islam in the Multicultural Society, on which this paper is based. The report presents the views of Rotterdam youth of Turkish, Moroccan, and native Dutch descent about a great number of religious, socio-cultural and political issues. It has been written by Karen Phalet, Claudia van Lotringen and Han Entzinger; so far the full report has been published in Dutch only.^[1] The data came from the Rotterdam Youth Survey, for which 900 young‑adults between the age of 18 and 30 were interviewed. The survey was carried out in late 1999/early 2000, that is well before the events of September 11, 2001. The comparative framework of this research was ensured by matching the randomised samples of Turkish and Moroccan youth against a  group of native Dutch youth in the same neighbourhoods and with a comparable (mostly low) schooling level. Consequently, the Dutch sample is not representative of all native Dutch in Rotterdam, but maximally comparable with the minority youth. The unique value of this research is not the assessment of 'hard results' of integration and participation, but concerns the subjective ideas, experiences and mutual stereotyping from the native Dutch, Turkish and Moroccan points of view.

An individualist and pluralist Islam

Our analyses of the meaning of Islam in the eyes of the Turkish and Moroccan youth in Rotterdam show a development in the direction of an individualised and pluralistic Islam. Individualised because most Muslim youth give shape to their religion in a personal way. Pluralistic because the Dutch version of Muslim identity allows for internal debate and different opinions, for example one can be for or against headscarves. Pluralistic also in a political way because the majority of youth view Islam as one social vision alongside others.

Remarkably, the second generation's attachment to their Muslim identity is undiminished, but their involvement with their country of origin diminishes the longer they stay in the Netherlands. Especially Moroccan youth consider themselves first and foremost Muslim and then Moroccan. Turks' identification with their country of origin is stronger, even among those raised in the Netherlands. Among both minority groups hardly anyone identifies with the Netherlands but many identify with Rotterdam. The limited extent to which minority groups identify with the Netherlands as a national state is evident in, for instance, how little is known of Dutch politics. Especially Turks know a lot more about political parties in Turkey than in the Netherlands.

Our analyses of mutual stereotyping between Muslim and Dutch youth confirm their experiences of an intercultural area of tension between Europe and Islam. One out of four Turks and one out of three Moroccans think that Europe is a political threat to Islam. Vice versa, one out of four Dutch views Islam as a political threat to Europe. The experience of contrast between Islamic and Western values is especially pertinent in the arena of family values. For example, values governing interaction between men and women, the rights of women, and the tension between authoritarian and permissive styles of upbringing. About 40% of all youth view these contrasts as insurmountable. There is no difference on this point between Turks and Moroccans raised in the Netherlands (second generation) and those who came to the Netherlands at a later age (first generation). However, the experience of these oppositions decreases as the educational level goes up.

A hardcore of fundamentalists

Of those surveyed, 66% of the Turkish and Moroccan youth thought one's faith should be a personal matter between God and the faithful, against 81% of the Dutch. Almost all the rest viewed religion as but one political vision among others. Only a few advanced the anti‑secular and anti‑pluralistic point of view that politics must be solely based on religion. Thus, the fear, of some native Dutch, of a militant Muslim‑fundamentalism in the Netherlands is without foundation. We define 'fundamentalism' as a collective noun for undemocratic political ideologies based on a religion (Islam or Christianity), just like 'the extreme‑right' stands for undemocratic political ideologies with a nationalistic or racist base. When analysing the political meaning of Islam, we give special attention to the extent of the potential for a fundamentalist version of political‑Islam among Muslim youth in the Netherlands.

Our analyses reveal that only a small hardcore element, about 5% of all youth, is susceptible to fundamentalist or extreme‑right political ideas. This hardcore consists of those who express their willingness to undertake illegal political actions or are members of an undemocratic political organisation or party with a fundamentalist, nationalist, or racist base. Such a hardcore can be found on the Dutch as well as on the Turkish or Moroccan side. There seems to be a small number of youth whose way of dealing with conflict is problematic, and who are willing to break the law or use violence regardless of the political aim.

Personal values and social ideals

As Islam develops into a part of Dutch society more points of congruity are arising between the Dutch youth and the minority youth regarding their cultural and political orientations. For instance, they both draw a clear dividing line between cultural choices made in the private sphere of the family and those made in the public sphere of the school. In the public sphere minority youth show a preparedness to give up their minority culture to a certain degree and to adapt partially to Dutch culture. For their part, Dutch youth accept that the Turkish and Moroccan cultures occupy an important place in the private sphere of minority families.

Moroccans and Turks are mutually more divided than Dutch youth in their personal value orientations and social ideals. For example, freedom to choose one's partner and  to interact freely with members of the opposite sex are difficult issues on which opinions differ strongly. Especially second generation Turkish and Moroccan women are more obstinate on such issues than their first generation counterparts. This does not mean that they wish to disown their Muslim identity, or shirk family obligations towards their parents. We see both points of difference between the values and views of native Dutch and minority youth as issues of consent. On several issues we noticed that the difference between Dutch and minority viewpoints is decreasing as the average level of education achieved increases. For example, the more highly educated youth are, regardless of their native descent, the more ethically tolerant of abortion and euthanasia they are. Furthermore, they are clearly more in favour of democratic rights and liberties than the less highly educated.

However, there is a general agreement concerning the value all groups place on social equality. All groups find equality more important to strive for than personal success, and the Dutch value the latter less than the Turks and Moroccans. As stated above, the differences are greatest in relation to central family‑values and ethical questions. Tolerant attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia and a high amount of mutual independence between parents and children are a matter of course for most Dutch, while they are anything but for Turkish and Moroccan youth.

Interethnic contacts and discrimination

Dutch and minority youth in Rotterdam move in a multi‑ethnic social environment. The typical circle of friends is ethnically diverse. Most of the Turkish and Moroccan youth in the survey also have Dutch friends and most of the Dutch have friends from ethnic minorities. This is not all that surprising, because this survey was of youth living in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. In principle, they like to live there, but both native Dutch as well as Turks and Moroccans prefer to live in neighbourhoods where, from their point of view, there are more Dutch inhabitants; such neighbourhoods are viewed as qualitatively better.

Despite reasonable levels of mutual understanding in the informal sphere, both Dutch and Turkish and Moroccan youth are very conscious of the prevalence of discrimination. More than 50% of the minority youth said they experienced discrimination sometimes, while about 15% said they were personally discriminated against on a regular or frequent basis. Remarkably, Dutch youth estimates the amount of discrimination against minorities as higher the minorities themselves do. Minorities perceive discrimination mostly as a structural phenomenon which is not directed at them personally. Native Dutch, on the other hand, perceive discrimination as an incidental phenomenon,  occurring more in the personal spheres of life, for example in daily contacts, while going out or at school. Minimally 5% and maximally 15% of the minority youth said they had  either definitely or probably had had to deal with racial harassment (intimidation or the use of violence for racist reasons) in the last two years. Physical and mostly verbal aggression seems to appear mostly among a small group of young‑adults under the age of 25 who experience difficulty in dealing with conflict.

Education

One of the most important conclusions of the survey is that the level of schooling has an enormous influence on views and orientations of both the native Dutch as well as the minority youth. Of course, it is widely accepted that successful schooling is the best way to create better chances for oneself in the labour market. From the survey results it has become evident that education also contributes to a widening of one's social horizon and an enlargement of one's cultural opportunities. This is especially true for Turkish and Moroccan women of the second generation. Minority youngsters who have received more education and on a higher level have more Dutch friends, next to their Turkish and Moroccan friends. Both native Dutch and minority youth become more individualist and liberal and less conformist and authoritarian in their orientations the more highly educated they become. There is no doubt that education is the pre‑eminent way to bring the worlds of the minorities and native Dutch in the Netherlands together. Particularly the more highly educated Turkish and Moroccan women are at the vanguard when it comes to bridging the gap between their parents' values and those of their multicultural social surroundings.

A multicultural tragedy?

Finally, what does this survey contribute to the ongoing social debate (especially prominent in past months) about the multicultural society? Do minorities really lead the closed life as suggested by some in this debate? And is an ethnic sub‑class arising in the big cities, without social opportunities and unfamiliar with Dutch culture? Is the situation as dramatic as Paul Scheffer, a Dutch publicist, in particular, and in imitation of him many others have posed? Based on this survey we can say that unacceptable social inequalities and contrasts all too often convert into discrimination or ethnic tensions. It is also apparent that the values and expectations of the native Dutch and minority groups do not always connect seamlessly. Scheffer is right in this respect.

But our survey shows that Scheffer and others like him are also wrong. To start with, his analysis underestimates the cultural diversity and mutual political and religious discussions within the Turkish and Moroccan Muslim communities in the Netherlands. Furthermore, his and other analyses tend to focus on points of conflict, disregarding the many points of similarity which exist between personal values and views of Turkish, Moroccan and native Dutch youth. Additionally, his idea of discriminated 'ethnic islands' in an ocean of Dutch people is in contrast to the real social world of youth in Rotterdam, where ethnic diversity is the rule rather than the exception, where most neighbourhoods are multi‑ethnic and where the inter‑ethnic relationships within neighbourhoods and schools are perhaps not close, but are definitely not characterized by animosity. And last but certainly not least, more schooling and schooling at a higher level not only increase the social opportunities available to young people, but also their cultural opportunities, and in a way that is acceptable to their parents.